

D/I. USAF AMENDMENTS TO FIA-39 "YUGOSLAVIA"

1. Reference page 2, par. 4: Delete par. 4 and substitute the following therefor: "A military invasion of Yugoslavia employing the combined armies of Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Albania, under unified command and given full logistical support by the Soviet Union has the capability of forcing the Yugoslav Army back into the mountainous region east of the Adriatic, and gradually extending control of the principal lines of communication to the major centers of that redoubt.

2. Reference page 2, par. 5: Delete and substitute as follows:  
"5. We estimate that under present conditions, in the event of full-scale invasion-by-Soviet-Satellite-forces, Soviet-Satellite forces could launch an invasion on such a scale as to rapidly overcome Yugoslav organized resistance. ~~Yugoslav forces would be incapable of maintaining organized resistance for more than a month.~~

3. Reference page 2, par. 6: Delete and substitute as follows:  
"6. Substantial Western assistance in military material ~~might~~ would probably enable Yugoslavia to defend itself successfully against a Satellite attack, and even to withstand make a Soviet-Satellite attack, for considerably more than a month so costly that it might not be expected to completion because of the prohibitive expenditures involved. However, such materiel would have to be adapted to the special requirements of Yugoslav forces to be effective in the initial phases of an invasion and in substantial amounts and would have to be delivered several months well in advance of an attack of hostilities.

4. Reference page 3, par. 7; line 6: Change as follows: ". . . . .  
Yugoslavia and as well as the risk of general war. It Although we are unable to assess the outcome, the Soviets may estimate further that a successful attack on Yugoslavia during 1961 would serve larger Soviet purposes by demoralizing and intimidating the peoples of Western Europe, frustrating the implementation of NATO plans, and rendering European governments susceptible to accommodation with the USSR.

5. Reference page 3, pars. 8 & 9: Reverse the following:  
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6. Reference page 6, par. 5, line 10: Change remainder of paragraph to read as follows: "In the event of invasion, the great majority of Yugoslavs would support Tito and ~~carry out what resistance was militarily possible~~ resist the invaders."

7. Reference page 9, par. 10, line 13: Change remainder of paragraph to read as follows: "The Yugoslav Air Force totals approximately 660 planes, but is hampered by a shortage of spare parts. The Yugoslavs received an estimated 800 aircraft and a two year level of supply from the USSR about four years ago, but this source has been cut off, since 1948, and the Yugoslavs are now in a critical period where their equipment has reached a state of doubtful value for sustained combat operations. Lacking outside military assistance, the capabilities of the Yugoslav Air Force will continue to decline rapidly during 1951. Aircraft now assigned to the Air Force are estimated at 660 of which approximately 350 are in tactical units. The Yugoslav Navy is small and inefficient but is nevertheless capable of successfully opposing any Satellite naval operation."

8. Reference page 12, par. 14, line 9: Change to read as follows: ". . . . . Satellites. Satellite air forces total approximately 900 ~~750~~ combat aircraft; . . . . ."

9. Reference page 13, par. 18, line 3: Change to read as follows: ". . . . . areas that would could be overrun soon after hostilities had commenced. . . . ."

10. Reference page 14, par. 18, line 6: Change to read as follows: ". . . . . Rail and motor routes from Trieste and Fiume would could, in the event. . . . ."

11. Reference page 14, par. 19, line 1: "19. In spite of these important losses, the large mountainous. . . . ."

12. Reference page 14, par. 19, line 5: ". . . . . mountainous regions, but these supplies would might be exhausted. . . . ."

13. Reference page 14, par. 20, line 2: "To insure the destruction of the regime, there would have to be a full scale invasion, either by Soviet-Satellite forces jointly or by all the neighboring Satellite forces alone, with "unofficial" Soviet assistance as required."

14. Reference page 15, par. SEC~~RET~~ Change to read as follows: "Under present conditions joint Soviet-Satellite forces could successfully invade Yugoslavia on such a scale as to rapidly overcome organised resistance, and eventually bring guerrilla opposition under control. In present circumstances, it is estimated that if the Yugoslav effort to defend on the Danubian plain, organised resistance could be destroyed within two weeks, even if Yugoslav forces withdrew immediately to defensive positions in the mountains, it is estimated that organised resistance could be destroyed within one month. The elimination of guerrilla opposition would take considerably longer and would depend on the extent of outside aid to the guerrillas and the scale of the Soviet-Satellite effort. Simply Western aid could considerably lengthen the period of resistance to such an invasion. Substantial Western assistance in military material would probably enable Yugoslavia to make a Soviet-Satellite attack so costly that it might not be pressed to completion because of the prohibitive expenditures involved. However, such material would have to be adapted to the special requirements of Yugoslav forces and to be effective would have to be delivered in substantial amounts well in advance of hostilities."

15. Reference page 15, par. 22: Delete entire paragraph and substitute the following: "In present circumstances, particularly in view of the Soviet capability of supplying continuing logistical support to the satellites, the Yugoslav armed forces would be forced back into the mountainous region east of the Adriatic and would gradually lose control <sup>of the</sup> the principal lines of communication to the major centers of that redoubt.

16. Reference page 17, par. 26, line 1: Add the following: "Although we are unable to assess the effects of a possible invasion of Yugoslavia the Kremlin. . . . ."